Wednesday 03 October 2007
Kidnappings, tortures, summary executions: the methods employed by Russian forces of "order" in Ingushya, this little Muslim republic in the Caucasus that belongs to the Russian Federation, strangely recall what happened in the late 1990s in neighboring Chechnya. There, the special units of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and of the Security Forces - the FSB, heir to the KGB's functions and methods - assume power over the population's right to live or die, under the pretext that Ingushya harbors a Muslim guerilla movement.
That movement is, in fact, present throughout the north of the Caucasus, from the province of Kabarda to Dagestan. However, by using blind repression, the Kremlin risks inflating the ranks of the insurgents rather than drying up their recruitment. Undoubtedly, the Russian central government fears losing control over these Caucasian republics which have always been restive under its guardianship. Yet - unlike the Chechens - the Ingush were not, up until now, tempted by separatist demands.
What are the reasons that push Vladimir Putin to use such heavy-handed methods? First, one should never underestimate the power of bad habits. The precedent of Chechnya also allows one to think that the approach of legislative elections - in December - then of the presidential election - in March 2008 - is pushing those in power to create hotbeds of tension in order to mobilize voters. The device worked well in 1999, when Mr. Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin. But, at that time, the result of the elections was no foregone conclusion, whereas now, after eight years of the Putin system, the government's hold on society leaves no room for any suspense. Mr. Putin has no need of a new domestic war to continue to manage - directly or through a proxy - the affairs of the state ... and of the economy.
Another hypothesis may explain the upsurge of tension in Ingushya: the overall situation in the Caucasus. Like Chechnya, Ingushya has a common border with Georgia, the Russians' bête noire, ever since it disengaged from the Kremlin's preponderant influence in 2003. Moscow considers that Caucasus republic, independent since 1991, to be the West's advance stronghold. Nothing must be neglected in order to destabilize it. Russia has expelled Georgians from its territory and ordered a form of blockade. It supports the two separatist regions in Georgia - Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia - and does not hesitate to provoke incidents at the Chechen border. Ingushya constitutes a new source of instability that may discourage the Americans from accepting Georgia into NATO. If that's his game, Mr. Putin would be playing with fire - domestically in Russia, with his neighbors and with the West.
"Putin the Strategist"
By Sarah Halifa-Legrand Interviews Vincent Jauvert
Le Nouvel Observateur
Tuesday 02 October 2007
Why does Vladimir Putin prefer to aspire to the post of prime minister rather than to change the Constitution so he could stand again for the presidency?
That's the big question. He could, in fact, have changed the Constitution so as to stay in power as Russian president: on the one hand, he has the majority required in the parliament for passing that constitutional amendment, and, on the other hand, many countries, beginning with France, do not limit the number of presidential terms, so why should Russia? Why doesn't Putin just give himself a more flexible rule, rather than play the weird mechanic in an operation that smacks of skullduggery? He's surely got some kind of idea behind it.... But what is it? One may attempt to explain his choice by invoking its "more democratic" aspect, because by aspiring this way to the prime ministership, Putin respects the Constitution and thus poses as the head of the majority, which suggests the British model.... But he doesn't fool anyone.
If one summarizes the three steps of his strategy, you get:
1. Less than three weeks ago, he named a prime minister, Zubkov, probably intended to succeed him.
2. Today, he puts himself at the head of his party's list, with the objective, it appears, of becoming prime minister in his turn.
3. Here there's an unknown: Either he ends up changing the Constitution all the same to reduce presidential power in order to give the prime minister, that is, himself, all the maneuvering room he needs, or he is certain that Zubkov or some other possible president will be a loyal devotee.
How do you explain the fact that Putin wants to hold onto power at any cost?
He has his good and his bad reasons, you could say. Among his "good reasons," it's probably a question of his desire to finish what he began: restoring Russia's image in the world, endowing it with an effective diplomacy and an industrial policy just now coming to light, pursuing the return of a government of law - which one may describe as extremely relative. As for his "bad reasons," he's certainly afraid that if he leaves the government he will not be legally and physically protected from his enemies. His friends, all from the KGB or the Saint-Petersburg town hall in the 1990s, also risk losing a great deal - these men who presently hold all the big economic positions: gas, oil, arms sales and mineral extraction. Putin has recreated a kind of Politburo with a handful of individuals brought together more as a clan than on an ideological basis, with the ideology - a mix of nationalism, anti-Americanism and social liberalism - having no end other than to constitute a means of mobilizing the population. In practice, all these men are extreme pragmatists who think in terms of money and power only.
Is there nothing that could threaten his power?
For the moment, it's difficult to see where that could come from. Putin is young; he still has a lot of time ahead of him. Although it's still possible to talk with him today, one may nonetheless fear that a few years from now, he could slide down the path of a Belarus-style regime should the syndrome of president-for-life be confirmed.
Although the United States broadcasts worries in the face of his behavior, it is very unlikely it will take a position against him because that would be interference in Russian domestic affairs. Especially given that Putin respects the Constitution by aspiring to the post of prime minister.
As far as domestic dissidents are concerned, the only one who comes from the system is his former Prime Minister Kasyanov, who sought to lead the opposition coalition, The Other Russia, a position that finally reverted to Kasparov. And Kasyanov paid dearly for his change of sides: He has been totally marginalized, torn up, humiliated; he has the taxman on his back; he's been charged with corruption. Lightning immediately strikes those who dare question the boss's power. As a KGB man, Putin understood the weaknesses of the democratic system: with his "democratura," he admirably and cynically takes advantage of them.
He saw how the Orange Revolution brought down semi-authoritarian regimes around him and he has found the means to prevent that type of scenario from coming about in his own country.
The system continues to have one weakness: It is based on the manna of hydrocarbons. As long as gas and oil prices remain high, it works. But what will happen if this capital resource declines? The house of cards could collapse....
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