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One of the last justifications for continuing the U.S. occupation of Iraq despite overwhelming opposition from Iraqis, Americans and the rest of humanity has come down to this: U.S. forces must remain in order to battle "al Qaeda in Iraq."
Like so many of the arguments presented in the United States, the idea is not only intellectually bankrupt, it's also the 180-degree opposite of reality. The truth of the matter is that only the presence of U.S. forces allows the group called "al Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI) to survive and function, and setting a timetable for the occupation to end is the best way to beat them. You won't hear that perspective in Washington, but according to Iraqis with whom we spoke, it is the conventional wisdom in much of the country.
The Bush administration has made much of what it calls "progress" in the Sunni-dominated provinces of central Iraq. But when we spoke to leaders there, the message we got was very different from what supporters of a long-term occupation claim: Many Sunnis are, indeed, lined up against groups like AQI, but that doesn't mean they are "joining" with coalition forces or throwing their support behind the Iraqi government.
Several sources we reached in the Sunni community agreed that AQI, a predominantly Sunni insurgent group that did not exist prior to the U.S. invasion -- it started in 2005 -- will not exist for long after coalition forces depart. AQI is universally detested by large majorities of Iraqis of all ethnic and sectarian backgrounds because of its fundamentalist interpretation of religious law and efforts to set up a separate Sunni state, and its only support -- and it obviously does enjoy some support -- is based solely on its opposition to the deeply unpopular U.S.-led occupation of Iraq.
We spoke by phone with Qasim Al-jumaili, a former member of Falluja's City Council, who was confident that his local militias would eliminate Al Qaeda in Iraq from Fallujah if U.S. forces were to withdraw. "The U.S. presence is making our work harder," he said. "For example, the Anbar Salvation Front [the Sunni tribal leadership group that declared war against Al Qaeda in Iraq], is not getting a lot of public support because they think we're collaborating with the U.S. and the Al-Maliki government."
Al Jumaili was confident that Iraqis wouldn't tolerate Al Qaeda in Iraq's presence in an independent Iraq. "If the U.S. was to pull out from Iraq and let Iraqis have a national government instead of the puppet one now, Iraqis with their government and tribal leaders would quickly eliminate Al Qaeda from all Iraq," he said. It's a credible statement -- most estimates of the terror group's strength suggest its membership is in the low thousands, no match for the larger organized militias or the fledgling security forces without the support of some of the residents of the areas in which they operate.
Contrary to the neat media narrative of a unified "Sunni" leadership that has turned on AQI and joined with the Americans -- a narrative wholly fabricated by the White House and repeated without skepticism by most of the traditional media -- the Sunni community in Iraq is fragmented and divided by a variety of shifting loyalties and interests. Canadian journalist Patrick Graham, who spent a year with Sunni militias, wrote of the "Anbar Awakening":
… It is still a shaky union, a desperate marriage of convenience based on shared enemies: Iran, and the Sunnis' former-friend-turned-foe Al Qaeda. Many of America's new allies are former insurgents and Saddam Hussein loyalists (Saddam was a Sunni) who only a short while ago were routinely called terrorists, "anti-Iraqi fighters," and "Baathist dead-enders." They are suspicious of one another and strongly anti-American, although willing to work, for the moment, with the U.S.
Iraq's Sunnis are divided; while there's a dramatic backlash against the AQI, the group receives its support from within the community. But according to Sunni leaders with whom we spoke, there won't be a unified opposition to the terror group as long as U.S. forces remain in the country.
MN, a leader of a local "social committee" in Fallujah who would only speak anonymously for security reasons, said of the emerging Sunni resistance to AQI: "I'll join them as soon as they cut their ties to the occupiers." Although opposed to AQI, he told us he would never join the fight against AQI as long as it is associated with the U.S.-led occupation.
One of the central tenets of counter-insurgency is that a small group of active fighters can be a powerful force of opposition, but only if they have at least the passive support of the populace. The second the United States commits to a complete withdrawal of its forces, Al Qaeda in Iraq will become a pariah organization and its members will be killed, if they're lucky, or captured if they're not.
See more stories tagged with: iraq, al qaeda
Raed Jarrar is Iraq consultant to the American Friends Service Committee. He blogs at Raed in the Middle. Joshua Holland is an AlterNet staff writer and editor.
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