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A new, very bleak report from Chatham House, the prestigious Royal Institute of International Affairs. Among its stark conclusions:
Continuing attempts to form a strong unified government in Baghdad are an exercise in futility. "Iraq" says the report "has fractured into regional power bases". Across "huge swathes of territory" decisions made by Iraqi leaders in the Green zone are largely irrelevant. The al-Maliki regime is merely one of several 'state-like actors' that now exist in Iraq." Key economic and security decisions are no longer made in Baghdad but by local sectarian, ethnic or tribal groups--whoever is currently on top in a particular city or district. Many of the major centers "have become lawless theaters of inter-and intra sectarian and inter-ethnic violent combat." "It can be argued that Iraq is on the verge of being a failed state which faces the district possibility of collapse and fragmentation."
The much vaunted surge has not reduced violence and deaths. If anything, the number of killings across the country has only increased. In fact, in some ways, the surge in Baghdad has made things worse: the withdrawal of large numbers of Moqtada al-Sadr's militia from Sadr City has allowed Sunni insurgents to increase their bloody attacks there. At the same time, insurgents are zeroing in on other more vulnerable parts of the country. There is not one civil war in Iraq but many; not one insurgency but many. Shiites are at war with Sunnis, at the same time as leaders of each sect battle ferociously for power and turf among themselves. Add to this a "rampant criminality across the country." Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda continues to expand its operations throughout the Centre and North. The thought that it could be defeated by tribal groups or other insurgents is a pipe dream. Return to any semblance of order will take many years--not months. Yet without U.S. Forces in the country, there is no way that Iraq's fledgling security services could cope with the current level of violence.
At the same time, because of a perfect storm of onrushing issues--such as possible American troop withdrawals and the battle over the petroleum law--2007 and 2008 promise to generate even more climactic bloodshed and violence. Though the Kurdish region has been relatively calm, the potential for sectarian strife is looming: Kurds and Arabs are heading for a showdown over control of the huge petroleum wealth around Kirkuk. - "The most capable foreign power in Iraq, in terms of influencing future events, is not the U.S. It is Iran."
What has to be done?
-Give up trying to form a strong, centralized Iraqi government. That will only lead to continued zero-sum feuding over turf and privilege. Recognize that Iraq is already--at best--a very loosely federated country and those divisions are "at least semi permanent." That means that Kurdish demands for autonomy have to be more publicly recognized rather than repressed or swept under the carpet. It means finding Sunni representatives to be part of whatever new formation takes shape. The radical Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr and his Jaish al-Mahdi militia have to be recognized and dealt with as legitimate players on the political chessboard, not targeted for elimination.
"Al-Sadr has become "against the odds, a figure of profound political importance." Ironically, rather than reducing the potential for Iranian influence in Iraq, the U.S. led attempts to destroy al-Sadr have only increased it The fiery young mullah is an Iraqi nationalist, who has charged other Shiite groups of being under the sway of Teheran. But the unrelenting hostility of the Coalition forces has forced al-Sadr to turn to Iranian security elements for logistical and financial report. . As for neighboring countries, they can help the process--more than the U.S. But their influence is still limited. They can only help stabilize Iraq if Iraqis themselves can somehow find a formula for mutual accommodation.
The report was written by Gareth Stansfield, of Chatham House and the University of Exeter. He recently published "Iraq: People, History, Politics" (Cambridge,: Polity Press 2007)
Tagged as: war in iraq, al-maliki, iraq
Barry Lando, a former 60 Minutes producer, is the author of "Web of Deceit: The History of Western Complicity in Iraq from Churchill to Kennedy to George W. Bush." He also blogs at « The AlterNet Blogs « PEEK « Barry Lando
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