BRAD BLOG - The results of California Secretary of State Debra Bowen's
"top-to-bottom review" of electronic voting systems previously approved
for use by her predecessor is still underway. But before any of the
findings from her teams of security specialists, software analysts and
voting systems experts have been made public, the unprecedented analysis
has already revealed a disturbing anomaly which may have far-reaching
implications for both state and federal voting systems laws across the
country. . .
After their refusal to submit the code as required for the test, Bowen
demanded the source code used for the InkaVote Plus voting systems
marketed by ES&S, and used exclusively in Los Angeles, be released to
the state by the escrow firm which had been holding it as per state law.
Following Bowen's demand to the escrow company, Iron Mountain
Intellectual Property Management, ES&S reluctantly agreed to give their
own version of the source code to the state.
Oddly enough at the time, the voting machine company, in an arrogant
letter to Bowen, demanded that she withdraw her request to receive the
version of the source code already stored in escrow at Iron Mountain.
The letter succeeded in keeping our already-raised eyebrows at full
perk, as the demand that Bowen not review the code in escrow, but rather
look only at the one ES&S was sending, raised several troubling
questions. Among them, we wondered at the time if perhaps the version
stored in escrow was not the version actually used on the county's
voting systems during last year's election. If so, there could be
enormous ramifications for the company, and for the idea of escrowed
source code for voting systems in general.
Over the weekend, an article in the Los Angeles Daily News, the first
organization to jump into this matter following our series of reports,
filed a story on the matter which began to validate our suspicions. The
paper reported that due to the late submission, the InkaVote Plus system
would not be included in Bowen's "top-to-bottom review", presenting
questions about which voting system would be allowed for use in 2008, in
the country's most populous county. LA County is larger than many states
in America.
It's as yet unclear whether Bowen will completely decertify the InkaVote
Plus system for use, or whether she will take other steps.
Perhaps more disturbingly, however, the Daily News report includes
comments from CA's Deputy Secretary of State for Voting Systems, Lowell
Finley, indicating that our concerns about differences in the submitted
and escrowed source code may have been precisely on target.
We contacted Bowen's office for more details, and they shared with us
the letter sent from Finley back to ES&S in response to the company's
curious demands. . .
"With regard to the InkaVote Plus source code," Finley writes in the
letter, "it has come to our attention that there are version number
discrepancies between the description provided by ES&S to Iron Mountain
of the source code deposited in escrow and the description of the system
as certified by the Secretary of State on April 21, 2006."
"As you know, Section 19213 of the Elections Code prohibits any change
to a voting system after it has been certified without written notice to
and approval by the Secretary, and Section 19103(a) also prohibits use
of a voting system if this requirement is not met."
Finley suggests that perhaps the version number discrepancies "may
represent no more than typographical errors," before confirming that his
office will, in fact, "continue to insist on access to the escrowed
source code.". . .
Prior to the 2004 Presidential Election, when it was revealed that
Diebold, Inc. had installed uncertified hardware and software for their
touch-screen voting systems in several California counties,
then-Secretary of State Kevin Shelley decertified the systems, and
banned Diebold from further selling that system in the state. Shelley's
successor, Bruce McPherson, who was later appointed by Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger, surprised many by re-certifying the Diebold TSx system
despite the discovery of myriad security flaws and previously
undisclosed source code which violated the Federal Voting Systems
Standards that all systems in the state must comply with prior to being
state-certified. . .
The questions begged by this matter may have far reaching national
consequences. The practice of requiring the escrowing of voting system
source code, for later review as needed (for example, in the event that
problems or questions are revealed during an election) has been gaining
traction around the country. A number of states, as well as pending
legislation in both the U.S. House (Rep. Rush Holt's HR 811) and Senate
(Sen. Diane Feinstein's S. 1487) require voting machine companies to
submit their source code into escrow for use in a later review as may be
required.
However, as the Los Angeles situation reveals, there may be few, if any,
safeguards keeping a vendor from storing one version in escrow and then
using a complete different version in actual elections.
Such a circumstance would not likely be revealed until, and unless, a
problem is later discovered. The result could be a false sense of
security by voters and elections officials that the escrowing of voting
system source code might actually offer any transparency or safety
whatsoever. . .
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=4784
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"top-to-bottom review" of electronic voting systems previously approved
for use by her predecessor is still underway. But before any of the
findings from her teams of security specialists, software analysts and
voting systems experts have been made public, the unprecedented analysis
has already revealed a disturbing anomaly which may have far-reaching
implications for both state and federal voting systems laws across the
country. . .
After their refusal to submit the code as required for the test, Bowen
demanded the source code used for the InkaVote Plus voting systems
marketed by ES&S, and used exclusively in Los Angeles, be released to
the state by the escrow firm which had been holding it as per state law.
Following Bowen's demand to the escrow company, Iron Mountain
Intellectual Property Management, ES&S reluctantly agreed to give their
own version of the source code to the state.
Oddly enough at the time, the voting machine company, in an arrogant
letter to Bowen, demanded that she withdraw her request to receive the
version of the source code already stored in escrow at Iron Mountain.
The letter succeeded in keeping our already-raised eyebrows at full
perk, as the demand that Bowen not review the code in escrow, but rather
look only at the one ES&S was sending, raised several troubling
questions. Among them, we wondered at the time if perhaps the version
stored in escrow was not the version actually used on the county's
voting systems during last year's election. If so, there could be
enormous ramifications for the company, and for the idea of escrowed
source code for voting systems in general.
Over the weekend, an article in the Los Angeles Daily News, the first
organization to jump into this matter following our series of reports,
filed a story on the matter which began to validate our suspicions. The
paper reported that due to the late submission, the InkaVote Plus system
would not be included in Bowen's "top-to-bottom review", presenting
questions about which voting system would be allowed for use in 2008, in
the country's most populous county. LA County is larger than many states
in America.
It's as yet unclear whether Bowen will completely decertify the InkaVote
Plus system for use, or whether she will take other steps.
Perhaps more disturbingly, however, the Daily News report includes
comments from CA's Deputy Secretary of State for Voting Systems, Lowell
Finley, indicating that our concerns about differences in the submitted
and escrowed source code may have been precisely on target.
We contacted Bowen's office for more details, and they shared with us
the letter sent from Finley back to ES&S in response to the company's
curious demands. . .
"With regard to the InkaVote Plus source code," Finley writes in the
letter, "it has come to our attention that there are version number
discrepancies between the description provided by ES&S to Iron Mountain
of the source code deposited in escrow and the description of the system
as certified by the Secretary of State on April 21, 2006."
"As you know, Section 19213 of the Elections Code prohibits any change
to a voting system after it has been certified without written notice to
and approval by the Secretary, and Section 19103(a) also prohibits use
of a voting system if this requirement is not met."
Finley suggests that perhaps the version number discrepancies "may
represent no more than typographical errors," before confirming that his
office will, in fact, "continue to insist on access to the escrowed
source code.". . .
Prior to the 2004 Presidential Election, when it was revealed that
Diebold, Inc. had installed uncertified hardware and software for their
touch-screen voting systems in several California counties,
then-Secretary of State Kevin Shelley decertified the systems, and
banned Diebold from further selling that system in the state. Shelley's
successor, Bruce McPherson, who was later appointed by Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger, surprised many by re-certifying the Diebold TSx system
despite the discovery of myriad security flaws and previously
undisclosed source code which violated the Federal Voting Systems
Standards that all systems in the state must comply with prior to being
state-certified. . .
The questions begged by this matter may have far reaching national
consequences. The practice of requiring the escrowing of voting system
source code, for later review as needed (for example, in the event that
problems or questions are revealed during an election) has been gaining
traction around the country. A number of states, as well as pending
legislation in both the U.S. House (Rep. Rush Holt's HR 811) and Senate
(Sen. Diane Feinstein's S. 1487) require voting machine companies to
submit their source code into escrow for use in a later review as may be
required.
However, as the Los Angeles situation reveals, there may be few, if any,
safeguards keeping a vendor from storing one version in escrow and then
using a complete different version in actual elections.
Such a circumstance would not likely be revealed until, and unless, a
problem is later discovered. The result could be a false sense of
security by voters and elections officials that the escrowing of voting
system source code might actually offer any transparency or safety
whatsoever. . .
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=4784
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