Wednesday, September 17, 2008

As Wall Street Collapses, Will Washington Get a Clue?


By Nomi Prins, AlterNet. Posted September 17, 2008.


The speculative nature of the financial industry is a threat to national economic security. It requires a serious exit strategy.

As the Dow hemorrhages, Wall Street firms are betting on which one will bite the dust next, and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke probably wishes he could leave as the next administration sets up shop, no one is proposing the long-term solution to the banking crisis: regulating the industry.

The Fed was right to turn Lehman Brothers away from its window during those final moments of doom on Sunday night. As such, the resulting $613 billion Chapter 11 filing, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history (WorldCom dropped to second with a mere $104 billion in assets) was secured.

It was wrong to back the $30 billion bailout of Bear Stearns in March, which facilitated JPM Chase's acquisition of Bear. It should not be the Fed's responsibility, or the government's, to back investment bank speculation. Instead, regulators should have been more vigilant as speculation outpaced available capital, and transparent quantification of risk went out the window.

However, it should be the government's job to stabilize the financial system; the question is how. Unfortunately, neither the Federal Reserve, nor the government, nor the presidential candidates have the slightest clue. Neither a blame game nor desperate piecemeal fixes will work. This is not about Republican or Democratic policies, but systemic bipartisan deregulation. Only a quick bout of sweeping and decisive regulation can fix what's broken.

In 1932, three years after the 1929 stock market crash, the banking system last stood at a brink of implosion. Franklin Delano Roosevelt zoomed past Herbert Hoover into the White House. The country was struggling through a Great Depression unleashed by the forces of unregulated economic greed. FDR stood up to the unrestrained power of Wall Street and contained it. The resultant New Deal included a stoplight at the heavy intersection of financial capital and unregulated greed, called the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.

Decisively, the Glass-Steagall Act forced institutions within the banking community to pick a side. If you want to deal with the population at large, take their deposits, give them a safe place for their savings and make reasonable loans for which you are as responsible as the borrowers -- terrific. As a commercial bank, you will have the newly established Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) backing your depositors. We, the federal government, will regulate you.

If you want to raise capital through speculative investors at home or overseas -- fine. But as an investment bank, you don't get our backing and you don't get to mix it up with citizens' lives or use their capital to fund your trading activities.

That simple premise, the pristine logic of the Glass-Steagall Act, not only kept consumer and speculative capital from intertwining within the same institution; it simplified the ability to understand the activities of all financial organizations. Transparency was not perfect, but it was more easily accomplished.

Lehman Brothers got a taste of the intent of Glass-Steagall. Its demise is ugly, not just because of its 156-year history, the 25,000 employees who are suddenly without jobs, or the long list of institutions to which Lehman owed money that will be slugging it out in bankruptcy court.


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Nomi Prins is a senior fellow at the public policy center Demos and author of Other People's Money and Jacked: How "Conservatives" Are Picking Your Pocket (Whether You Voted for Them or Not).

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