9/11 Ted Olson's Report of Phone Calls from Barbara Olson
The Justice Department did not respond to a request for more information.
http://www.salon.
April 3, 2008: The Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel memo dated March 14, 2003 on interrogation of enemy combatants that was declassified this week "exemplifies the political abuse of classification authority," Secrecy News suggested yesterday. J. William Leonard, the nation's top classification oversight official from 2002-2007, concurred.
"The disappointment I feel with respect to the abuse of the classification system in this instance is profound," said Mr. Leonard, who recently retired as director of the Information Security Oversight Office, which reports to the President on classification and declassification policy.
The document in question is purely a legal analysis," he said, and it contains "nothing which would justify classification.
"It is not even apparent that [John] Yoo [who authored the memo] had original classification authority," Mr. Leonard said.
NOTE: Per EXECUTIVE ORDER 13292 dated March 25,2003 only specific U.S. government officials like agency heads and officials designated by the President in the Federal Register; with specific rank may classify information (documents, etc.) at various classification levels.
That is, levels such as confidential, secret, and top secret.
I find it interesting that the Vice President has been given the original classification authority "in the performance of executive duties" in this March 2003 Executive Order.
I find this HIGHLY UNUSUAL, given that the chain of command for our U.S. executive branch's, department secretaries or agencies are under the President, not the Vice President. I suspect this Executive Order 13292 was changed or supersedes previous EOs to add the Vice President. I think this is unconstitutional because the VP has no executive duties until the President dies.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13292 see: http://www.fas.
From a secrecy policy point of view, the document itself exemplifies the political abuse of classification authority. Though it was classified at the Secret level, nothing in the document could possibly pose a threat to national security, particularly since it is presented as an interpretation of law rather than an operational plan. Instead, it seems self-evident that the legal memorandum was classified not to protect national security but to evade unwanted public controversy.
What is arguably worse is that for years there was no oversight mechanism, in Congress or elsewhere, that was capable of identifying and correcting this abuse of secrecy authority.
Had the ACLU not challenged the withholding of the document in court, it would undoubtedly remain inaccessible.
Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States - Justified Warrantless Surveillance
03 April 2008: In a footnote of the above noted secret memo states, "Our office recently concluded that the Fourth Amendment (right against seach and seizure without probable cause) had no application to domestic military operations," referring to a Justice department titled "Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States" dated Oct. 23, 2001.
For at least 16 months after the Sept. 11 terror attacks in 2001, the Bush administration believed that the Constitution'
Exactly what domestic military action was covered by the October memo is unclear. But federal documents indicate that the memo relates to the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program, or TSP.
That program intercepted phone calls and e-mails on U.S. soil, bypassing the normal legal requirement that such eavesdropping be authorized by a secret federal court. The program began after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and continued until Jan. 17, 2007, when the White House resumed seeking surveillance warrants from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
http://www.truthout
Irregular Warfare (IW), Strategic Communications; Information Operations (IO)? against state and non-state adversaries in future protracted regional, multi-regional and global engagements/








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