THE FAULTY PRESUMPTIONS OF HAWKDOM

DANIEL KAHNEMAN, JONATHAN RENSHON, FOREIGN POLICY - When we constructed
a list of the biases uncovered in 40 years of psychological research, we
were startled by what we found: All the biases in our list favor hawks.
These psychological impulses . . . incline national leaders to
exaggerate the evil intentions of adversaries, to misjudge how
adversaries perceive them, to be overly sanguine when hostilities start,
and overly reluctant to make necessary concessions in negotiations. In
short, these biases have the effect of making wars more likely to begin
and more difficult to end.

None of this means that hawks are always wrong. One need only recall the
debates between British hawks and doves before World War II to remember
that doves can easily find themselves on the wrong side of history. More
generally, there are some strong arguments for deliberately instituting
a hawkish bias. It is perfectly reasonable, for example, to demand far
more than a 50-50 chance of being right before we accept the promises of
a dangerous adversary. The biases that we have examined, however,
operate over and beyond such rules of prudence and are not the product
of thoughtful consideration. Our conclusion is not that hawkish advisors
are necessarily wrong, only that they are likely to be more persuasive
than they deserve to be. . .

A policymaker or diplomat involved in a tense exchange with a foreign
government is likely to observe a great deal of hostile behavior by that
country's representatives. Some of that behavior may indeed be the
result of deep hostility. But some of it is simply a response to the
current situation as it is perceived by the other side. What is ironic
is that individuals who attribute others' behavior to deep hostility are
quite likely to explain away their own behavior as a result of being
"pushed into a corner" by an adversary. The tendency of both sides of a
dispute to view themselves as reacting to the other's provocative
behavior is a familiar feature of marital quarrels, and it is found as
well in international conflicts. During the run-up to World War I, the
leaders of every one of the nations that would soon be at war perceived
themselves as significantly less hostile than their adversaries.

If people are often poorly equipped to explain the behavior of their
adversaries, they are also bad at understanding how they appear to
others. This bias can manifest itself at critical stages in
international crises, when signals are rarely as clear as diplomats and
generals believe them to be. . .

Excessive optimism is one of the most significant biases that
psychologists have identified. Psychological research has shown that a
large majority of people believe themselves to be smarter, more
attractive, and more talented than average, and they commonly
overestimate their future success. People are also prone to an "illusion
of control": They consistently exaggerate the amount of control they
have over outcomes that are important to them - even when the outcomes
are in fact random or determined by other forces. It is not difficult to
see that this error may have led American policymakers astray as they
laid the groundwork for the ongoing war in Iraq. . .

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3660&print=1

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