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[The Times plays down the import of this story, but basically the
California Secretary of State found that these machines are not to be
trusted]
NY TIMES - Expressing concern that several brands of electronic voting
machines used in California were vulnerable to tampering, Secretary of
State Debra Bowen late Friday ordered new security protections be added
and limited the use of two types of machines that were to be used in
next year's elections in several Southern California counties. Bowen
also withdrew state approval of the InkaVote Plus machines used in Los
Angeles County, saying that the machines' maker, Election Systems and
Software, had failed to submit its equipment to her office in time to
analyze its vulnerability to hacking. . .
Bowen ordered that some machines made by Diebold Election Systems and
Sequoia Voting Systems be limited to one per polling place to limit the
chances that they could be tampered with. The Sequoia machines are used
in Riverside, San Bernardino and Ventura Counties.
Bowen said the presence of the machines, though limited, would be
helpful for disabled voters, though any voter could use the machines.
Weir, however, said she was creating a "separate but unequal" voting
system.
The security requirements Bowen imposed include: reinstalling the
software before the Feb. 5. election to ensure it has not already been
tampered with; placing special seals at vulnerable parts of the machines
to reveal tampering; securing each machines at the close of each day of
early voting; assigning a specific election monitor to safeguard each
machine; and conducting a complete manual count of all votes cast.
BRAD BLOG - The [review] had found that all electronic voting systems
certified in California were easily accessible to hacking. A single
machine, the testers discovered, could be easily tampered with by an
election insider, voting machine company employee, or other individual
in such a way that an entire election could be effected without
detection. . .
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/04/us/04oakland.html?ei=5065&en=
0324fe3463e9ed12&ex=1186804800&partner=MYWAY&pagewanted=print
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[The Times plays down the import of this story, but basically the
California Secretary of State found that these machines are not to be
trusted]
NY TIMES - Expressing concern that several brands of electronic voting
machines used in California were vulnerable to tampering, Secretary of
State Debra Bowen late Friday ordered new security protections be added
and limited the use of two types of machines that were to be used in
next year's elections in several Southern California counties. Bowen
also withdrew state approval of the InkaVote Plus machines used in Los
Angeles County, saying that the machines' maker, Election Systems and
Software, had failed to submit its equipment to her office in time to
analyze its vulnerability to hacking. . .
Bowen ordered that some machines made by Diebold Election Systems and
Sequoia Voting Systems be limited to one per polling place to limit the
chances that they could be tampered with. The Sequoia machines are used
in Riverside, San Bernardino and Ventura Counties.
Bowen said the presence of the machines, though limited, would be
helpful for disabled voters, though any voter could use the machines.
Weir, however, said she was creating a "separate but unequal" voting
system.
The security requirements Bowen imposed include: reinstalling the
software before the Feb. 5. election to ensure it has not already been
tampered with; placing special seals at vulnerable parts of the machines
to reveal tampering; securing each machines at the close of each day of
early voting; assigning a specific election monitor to safeguard each
machine; and conducting a complete manual count of all votes cast.
BRAD BLOG - The [review] had found that all electronic voting systems
certified in California were easily accessible to hacking. A single
machine, the testers discovered, could be easily tampered with by an
election insider, voting machine company employee, or other individual
in such a way that an entire election could be effected without
detection. . .
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/04/us/04oakland.html?ei=5065&en=
0324fe3463e9ed12&ex=1186804800&partner=MYWAY&pagewanted=print
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