The Toothless Tiger Proposal
Throughout this month, several conservative senators have offered rhetoric suggesting they are ready to break with President Bush's escalation policy in Iraq. But instead of supporting a firm withdrawal, many are embracing weak legislation introduced by Sens. Ken Salazar (D-CO) and Lamar Alexander (R-TN) that would make the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) official U.S. policy but without a date for withdrawal. Like the ISG, the legislation would call for the administration to "hand off the combat mission to the Iraqis, bolster diplomatic efforts in the region and pave the way for a drawdown of troops." But Congress should not fully invest itself in all of the ISG's recommendations, as this legislation advocates. Today, in an Iraq faced with increased sectarian violence and a bitterly divided government, the ISG's recommendations have largely been overtaken by events due to the changed conditions as a result of the escalation. Instead, the best option to stabilize Iraq and the surrounding region is to reset our approach and responsibly redeploy U.S. troops from Iraq.
THE TOOTHLESS TIGER: Several senators have called for a change in strategy but are seeking political comfort in a strategy that, according to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), has "less teeth than a toothless tiger." Specifically, Salazar introduced an amendment that would "make the Iraq Study Group's proposals the policy of the United States, setting a "goal" of removing "most" U.S. troops by March 2008. But Salazar's amendment does not set a firm date for withdrawal. Drawing some bipartisan support, the amendment is largely supported by "defectors" more sympathetic to Bush's failing escalation plan. Co-sponsor Sen. Bob Bennett (R-UT) beamed: "The full complement of troops only arrived two weeks ago," echoing the White House talking point. Co-sponsor Alexander said yesterday, "The surge can be within this larger strategy of the Iraq Study Group," revealing his gut faith in the escalation. Thus, despite calling for a change in course, these senators still take stock in the White House strategy. As Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL) noted, "[O]nly real policy change will start bringing American soldiers home. Unfortunately, the Salazar-Alexander amendment doesn't achieve that."
TRAINING A CIVIL WAR: The ISG recommended that "the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army," proposing an American advisory effort of between 10,000 and 20,000. But as Center for American Progress President and CEO John Podesta and senior fellows Lawrence Korb and Brian Katulis state, that approach "is deeply problematic" as Iraqi security forces are far from reliable. Despite pouring over $20 billion into training the Iraqi forces, "the Pentagon estimates that at least one-third of the Iraqi Army is on leave at any one time; desertion and other problems bring the total to over half in some units." Ultimately, the United States is "arming different sides in multiple civil wars that could turn even more vicious in the coming years." In the current Baquba offensive, U.S. commanders are observing Sunni and Shiite soldiers cooperating with Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias, groups that are responsible for a majority of the violence. Judging by past trends, the U.S. should already be wary, as "violence has escalated at the same time as the number of trained Iraqi security forces has increased." Testifying before Congress last month, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, in charge of transitioning Iraqi security forces, said several thousand Iraqi police were "unaccounted for" by U.S. forces. Asked whether those police could be fighting U.S. troops, Dempsey replied, "We just don't know."
BITTERLY DIVIDED GOVERNMENT: The ISG places a heavy emphasis on the strengthening the Iraq central government through key benchmarks, but this approach "ignores the key reality that Iraq may suffer from unbridgeable divides." This method is failing already. This week, a progress report from the Bush administration will assert that "[o]n the political front, none of the benchmarks that have been achieved include the high-profile legislation on which Congress asked to see progress." Thomas Fingar, deputy director for analysis at the National Intelligence Council, reports "few appreciable gains" as "communal violence and scant common ground between Shi'as, Sunnis and Kurds continues to polarize politics." The sectarian interests embedded in the national government have had far reaching effects, seen, for example, in how Maliki has "used the Iraqi security forces" to go "after Sunni insurgents with Iraqi forces, leaving the impression that he is acting on behalf of Shi'a sectarian interests." Top Shi'a and Sunni officials have even resigned in frustration. As Podesta, Korb, and Katulis write, "Iraq's leaders fundamentally disagree on what Iraq is and should be. Any possible reconciliation is "much deeper...than the United States can provide unilaterally."
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